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Three Discourses on Practice:
A Postmodern Re-appraisal
PETER LEONARD
School of Social Work
McGill University
Montreal, Canada

The currentdebate about the knowledge claims of modernity has profound
implicationsfortheoriesand practicesofsocial welfare, though postmodern
critiquesof its foundational beliefs should be approached cautiously. This
paper suggests that a postmodern critique of three historicallysignificant
discourses-American casework, Britishsocialadministrationand Marxist
social work - illustrates what might be learnedfrom a deconstruction of
their modernistassumptionsas a stage in a reconstructionof social welfare
ideas appropriateto postmodern conditions.
The debate about modernity and postmodernism has plunged
a whole range of disciplines in the social sciences and humanities
into turmoil in the past ten years. In part, it is a debate about the
knowledge claims of that Western historical trajectory signified by
the term "Enlightenment" which, in the name of universal reason,
order and science brought modernity, primarily in a capitalist
form, first to Europe, then to north America, and now to the whole
world. Against the assertion that this process of "modernization"
is essentially emancipatory in its effects, or at least its potential,
postmodernists argue that modernity represented a eurocentric
and destructive triumphalism based upon a philosophical foundation which resulted in dogmatism and the attempted homogenization of a world of diverse cultures, beliefs and histories.
Only recently does this debate appear to be having some
impact on social work practice and education. Moore and Wallace
(1993), for example, present postmodernism as an unambiguously progressive force which will contribute to an "emancipatory social work". The notion that postmodernism is clearly on the
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side of radical and critical approaches to social work is, however,
open to considerable debate. Outside of social work, feminists,
for example, are divided on the question of whether modernity is
finished and must give way to postmodern deconstruction of its
universalistic assumptions (Nicholson 1992), or whether modernity retains its validity as an emancipatory process for humanity,
as Lovibond (1989) argues. Marxists are also in dispute amongst
themselves over the role of postmodernism as a critique of "grand
narratives", with some protagonists, such as Laclau and Mouffe
(1985) engaging in a wholesale deconstruction of Marxist beliefs
in the primacy of class struggle and of economic determinants,
whilst others see such attempts at re-stating Marxism as a betrayal
of socialist aspirations ( Geras 1987).
Given the ambiguity and complexity of the debate about
postmodernism, and the often arcane language in which it is
conducted, it would seem wise to approach postmodernism cautiously. In this paper I explore some specific examples of historically important discourses in the field of social work and
social welfare to see what postmodernism might offer in terms
of critique. My own view is that postmodernism is not a contemporary critical alternative to modernism, but a form of reflective
consciousness which may contribute to a reconstitution of the
project of modernity in a direction which is more diverse, crosscultural and non-universalistic in its claims.
I have chosen to begin a discussion on three discourses: American casework, Britishsocial administration,and Marxist socialwork. I
shall focus on negative critiques of these discourses in an effort to
highlight the challenge of postmodern ideas, but I would argue
that the next stage in critique should be to examine the contradictions within each discourse. On the one hand, I maintain that
they exhibit the typical illusions and tendencies to domination of
modernist discourse whilst on the other, I suggest in the conclusion that they have contributions to make to the possibilities of
emancipatory practices in social welfare.
Practice Discourses as Political Ideologies
Within the project of Western modernity social welfare was
seen as carrying a significant function in responding to the social
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consequences of the structural dynamic of capitalist modernization. We must begin by recognizing that the three discourses
represent different interpretations of this function based upon
three different political ideologies: liberal, social democratic, and
revolutionary socialist.
The significant and influential texts in the formative literature
of American casework before the mid 1970s, for example Charlotte Towle's Common Human Needs (1945/1973), Helen Perlman's
Social Casework (1957), and Florence Hollis' Casework:A Psychosocial Therapy (1969) were deeply influenced by discourses outside
social work, including psychoanalysis and structural-functional
sociology, and later systems theory, especially through the work
of Allen Pincus and Anne Minahan (1973). At the ideological
level these texts represented a particular set of liberal ideas and
rhetoric: the importance of individual self-determination, the existence of common human needs which social workers could
understand and respond to, the central value of the family as
an institution, professionalism as a benign force in society, and
a relatively unreflecting acceptance, with some reservations and
reformist notions, of the capitalist social order in which it was
rooted.
British social administration, in contrast, had its roots within
the Fabian tradition of social reform. It was an academic field
of study closely integrated into the social democratic politics of
Britain from the early 1950s, powerfully advocating an expanding
Welfare State which would improve the life chances of the whole
population, but especially the working class, whilst still maintaining a reduced but substantial market economy: the market
and welfare were to co-exist. For the most influential texts within
this tradition we need only refer, initially, to the work of Richard
Titmuss, especially his Essays on the Welfare State (1962) and Commitment to Welfare (1968). These texts were profoundly influential,
not only in providing a basis for the analysis of social policies, but
also as representing welfare as a moral imperative-the ethical
case for social democratic institutions within a reformed capitalist economy, sometimes called a mixed economy, or even postcapitalism.
Radical perspectives on social welfare emerged as a predominantly marxist or marxist-influenced discourse which contested
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the ideological terrain occupied by American casework models
and also the reformism and theoretical weakness in terms of class
analysis, of mainstream social administration. It was a discourse
based primarily on Marxist and socialist feminist scholarship and
politics in a number of countries, and interestingly began to have
its most significant impact from the mid -1970s onwards when the
idea of welfare was already in retreat as the political influence of
neo-conservatism grew, and capitalist economies took a new turn
towards globalism. For early texts in this political movement of
radical social welfare we might refer to Frances Piven and Richard
Cloward's Regulating the Poor (1972), Jeffrey Galper's The Politicsof
Social Services (1975), Roy Bailey's and Mike Brake's Radical Social
Work (1975) and also Elizabeth Wilson's Women and the Welfare
State (1977), which reflected the tension between Marxism and
feminism in this field. As a perspective, radical social work and
social policy quickly split into a number of different ideological
positions represented by the varieties of Marxism and feminism
which fuelled it. In this paper, I intend to focus on the specifically
Marxist tendency in this movement: the crucial influence of feminism is another, though interconnected story. During the 1970s
and early 1980s this Marxist tendency emphasized the critique
of dominant forms of social welfare theory and practice, but it
gradually attempted to construct alternative forms of practice
based upon the central ideas of class struggle, patriarchy and the
inherently exploitive nature of the capitalist state and economy.
The task of preliminary deconstruction will be to highlight not
only the ideological divergencies between these discourses which
we can see at once, but also their common features. From the point
of view of postmodernism, it may be argued that despite their
differences they also present a continuity found in their adherence
to "science", in their determination to control or guide others
"in their own interests", in their giving priority to certain kinds
of expert knowledge over other forms of social knowledge, in
their subordination of those without expert knowledge to the
power of professional, bureaucratic or political authority. In his
work on the discourses of madness, sexuality and punishment,
Foucault (1967; 1979; 1977) was able to demonstrate how deeply
embedded are the assumptions and forms of power expressed in
the language of these discourses (Sheridan 1980; Gordon 1985).

PracticeDiscourses

Modernity, Progress and Order
We can begin a critical reading of postmodernism as it illuminates our three discourses by confronting the uncompromising
challenge to the modern idea of progress which we find in the
work of Jean- Francois Lyotard. It is a challenge to that humanist
optimism which lies at the core of the whole enterprise of social welfare--the belief that planned, scientifically-based social
intervention is a benign project. Lyotard's (1989 : 89) assault on
Enlightenment beliefs is a powerful one:
One can note a sort of decay in the confidence placed by the last two
centuries in the idea of progress. This idea of progress as possible,
probable or necessary was rooted in the certainty that the development of the arts, technology, knowledge and liberty would be
profitable to mankind as a whole.... After two centuries, we are
more sensitive to signs that signify the contrary. Neither economic
nor political liberalism, nor the various Marxisms, emerge from the
sanguinary last two centuries free from the suspicion of crimes
against mankind. I use the name of Auschwitz to point out the
irrelevance of empirical matter, the stuff of recent past history, in
terms of the modem claim to help mankind to emancipate itself.
To the name Auschwitz could be added other names signifying the recent history of crimes against humanity-Dresden,
Hiroshima, the Gulag, Cambodia. The postmodernist argument
is that these and countless other crimes were justified by reference
to powerful ideologies which originated in the pursuit of progress
and order: fascism, liberal democracy, Marxism. Lyotard (1989:9)
argues that "the grand narratives of legitimation are no longer
credible" and have lost their power to provide a foundation for
social criticism. On the other side of the argument, we can see
that rejection of the humanist idea of the inevitability of progress
and of the grand narratives which underpin it, can clearly serve
entirely reactionary purposes and a nihilistic withdrawal from
the political arena, a neo- conservative version of postmodernism,
in fact.
However, the contention that grand theories tend to objectify
human subjects who then become the bearers of biological destiny, of human essence, or of a revolutionary task is well made. The
appeal to science as a justification for professional, bureaucratic
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or revolutionary practice, tends to solidify power in the hands
of intellectuals and state functionaries and denies it to the mass
of the oppressed and the dispossessed whose welfare has been
claimed to be one of the central rationales of scientific advance
in the West. Also, the postmodernist claim that progress cannot
be guaranteed may be taken as a means of counteracting eurocentric conceptions of the world in which the West triumphantly
brings the fruits of "Civilization" to the Other. To believe in the
inevitability of progress involves the conception of an impersonal
force called History as Popper (1957) famously pointed out, a force
which unfolds itself through the specific histories of particular
struggles and peoples ( Attridge, Bennington, Young 1987). Such
a mechanical notion of the process of history objectifies historical
subjects and legitimates the leadership claims of a ruling class,
a political 6lite or a revolutionary vanguard by reference to their
historical role. But does accepting the postmodernist critique of
grand narratives requires us to abandon all attempts to conceptualize in a broad way such issues as the various oppressions experienced in terms of gender, class and ethnicity, or more concretely,
the problem of world-wide poverty, or the relation between the
human species and the natural world?
The lesson of postmodern critique is surely that we should
subject all grand theories to an interrogation as to their implications in terms of objectification, knowledge production and
the processes of domination. We must admit, however, that the
basis of such interrogation is inevitably another grand theory
embedded in the postmodern perspective on the historic failure
of the humanist idea of progress. Foucault's dislike of overarching
theories and his wish to destroy the human sciences in the name
of our liberation as humans is itself based upon a grand narrative
of the nature of knowledge and its links with coercive power. We
cannot do without grand theory, it seems; perhaps we can learn
to approach it cautiously and reflexively, taking full account of its
dangers and illusions.
Progress, Science and Welfare Practice
How do our three discourses fare when evaluated in terms of
their adherence to humanist ideas on the role of specific kinds of
knowledge in ameliorating or confronting individual and social
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problems? It is clear at once that these discourses are deeply embedded in legitimation narratives which appeal to the authority of
science as well as to a moral imperative to change people and/or
situations in ways which are expected to enhance their welfare.
Central to the discourse of American casework was a belief that liberal democratic progress could be achieved through
"knowledge of the science of human relations" (Bowers 1949),
and that "the characteristic method of social work incorporates
within its processes both scientific knowledge and social values
in order to achieve its ends" (Hamilton 1951:3). Although we
see in American casework literature an adherence to scientific
theories drawing, for example, on key metaphors from medicine
such as the notions of diagnosis and treatment, we also find
a belief that progress through a science aimed at ameliorating
human suffering draws upon the professional practice of social
workers -their experience of the "real world." These two sources
of knowledge-scientific theory and professional practice-are
seen as the basis of a moral commitment to individual adaptation
and social change. Social workers are empowered to act on behalf
of the progressive impulses of society as a whole:
The professions charged by society to educate, help and heal people have become increasingly concerned with contributing to the
development of the individual. As we have inched toward the interdependence implicit in a democracy, society's aim progressively
has been to afford the individual opportunity for the development
of his capacities (Towle 1945/1973:15).
We can put aside, for this discussion, the problems which
the language of this passage presents: the reification of the term
"society", the rhetoric of "democracy", the implicit normalization
in the idea of individual capacities and development. Towle's
passage can be taken as representative of a profound belief in the
progress achieved in U.S. democracy, and a moral legitimation
for professional intervention in people's lives in order to enable
them to enhance their capacities and development as individuals.
Whilst within the American casework tradition, moral commitment to the idea of progress was tied to a belief in the values
of liberal democracy, in British social administration this commitment took on the tougher form of a moral critique of contemporary capitalist society. In the tradition of social democratic
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humanism, it was intent on using the empirical social sciences,
especially statistics, to condemn the continued existence of poverty and gross inequality and to see progress towards equality as
possible within a reformed society. In undertaking a statistical reevaluation of income distribution for example, Titmuss (1962) is
concerned to "study the rich and the sources of power in society,"
because "ancient inequalities have assumed new and more subtle
forms; conventional categories are no longer adequate for the task
of measuring them" (Titmuss, op.cit : 199). In a similar moral
approach, Townsend (1979) uses a mass of empirical material to
indict current economic and social policy for the continuation and
growth of poverty in Britain.
This moral critique was accompanied by optimism in the
future. Donnison (1970) for example, argues that liberty, equality
and fraternity are social goals to which Britain can aspire in a
context of continuing economic prosperity:
Eventually it should be possible to maintain the process by which
policies for the equalization of income, wealth and living standards
extend freedom and promote innovation and development which
ensure the continuing economic growth that makes further progress
towards equality possible (Donnison op.cit. : 23).
Titmuss's work was based upon a conviction of social democracy's moral superiority in terms of the social relations it fosters. In
his study of blood donor systems in the United States and Britain,
which he called The Gift Relationship (1970), Titmuss argued that
the voluntary British system is morally and socially superior as
well as more cost-effective compared with the American system
of paying for blood because the former is a social rather than an
economic exchange. Titmuss develops this distinction between
social policy and the market as a crucial defining characteristic of
social administration:
Social administration is thus concerned, for instance, with different
types of moral transactions, embodying notions of gift-exchange,
of reciprocal obligations, which have developed in modern societies in institutional forms to bring about and maintain social and
community relations... The grant, or the gift or unilateral transferwhether it takes the form of cash, time, energy, satisfaction, blood or
even life itself-is the distinguishing mark of the social (in policy and
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administration) just as exchange or bilateral transfer is the mark of
the economic. (Titmuss 1968: 21-22).
The analysis of certain kinds of moral transactions is, for
Titmuss and his co-workers, a scientific pursuit involving knowledge-building "which is one of the attributes of science," (Titmuss
op. cit.: 24) a pursuit which his Marxist critics saw as lacking an
overarching structural theory of class exploitation which alone
could satisfactorily explain the empirical data on poverty and
inequality which social administration research revealed.
In its reaction against both the liberal American casework
tradition and the social democratic thrust of British social administration, Marxist perspectives on welfare argued for their own
versions of progress and science, for historical materialism. The
ultimate authority on what was science and what was progress
was to be found in Marx's work. In much of the radical social
work literature, Marxist analyses of contradictions within the
state apparatus were undertaken in order to identify arenas of
class struggle, so that the Welfare State became the location in
which a critical social work practice was possible (Leonard, 1993).
Radical study of social policy was, by the early 1980s, dominated
by a Marxist "political economy" approach which emphasised the
role of the state in the reproduction of class and gender relations.
The science of historical materialism provided then, the overarching paradigm for Marxist writers on social work. At the beginning of their introduction to Radical Social Work, the editors,
Bailey and Brake (1975) present their perspective on the welfare
state grounded in a particular grand narrative:
Any understanding of the position of social welfare in our society
requires an understanding of its history, and an understanding of the
state. 'The state is founded upon the contradiction between public
and private life, between general and particular interests . .'(Marx
and Engels, The German Ideology)... Marx and Engels argue in The
Manifesto of the Communist Party (1848) that 'the executive of the
modem state is but a committee for managing the common affairs
of the whole bourgeoisie'. The state executive not only controls the
political and economic situation, but also the distribution of welfare
schemes.
Bailey & Brake op. cit. : 2, 3.
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The certainty about any understanding having to be founded
upon Marxist analysis can be seen in the editor's introduction to
the first of a series of texts on radical social work and social policy:
...this series is based on the proposition that its foundation must
be predominantly Marxist. It cannot, therefore, depend primarily
on the bourgeois disciplines of sociology, psychology, economics or
social administration: it must seek to develop a Marxist political
economy, a Marxist theory of the welfare state and, most difficult of
all, a Marxist theory of interpersonal relations.
Leonard (1978) : xiii

Thus the science of historical materialism is seen as providing
the guide, outside of which exist only "bourgeois disciplines"
which by definition cannot furnish an understanding of social
welfare. Although western Marxism was always more permeable,
more diverse and more critical than its orthodox Soviet variants, it
tended, until the entry of feminism as a powerful theoretical and
political critique, to remain hermetically sealed within its own discourse. Like their political opponents the Marxist writers on social
welfare remained children of the European Enlightenment belief
in progress. Although stronger in critique than in prescriptions
for action, they continued to hold the view that social and moral
progress meant moving towards some form of state socialism,
often avoiding the contemplation of the contradictions of the
"actual, existing" socialist states of Eastern Europe and elsewhere.
Belief in the inevitable progress of modernization legitimated
social welfare interventions, but often closed the eyes of writers
to the negative aspects of these interventions. Scientific work,
Kuhn (1970) points out, normally takes place within a dominant
paradigm which controls and socializes those who work within
it. Until it is effectively challenged by a "scientific revolution," the
dominant paradigm acts as a filter through which all results are
assessed, and negative results which do not confirm the paradigm
are explained away as aberrations, as poorly conducted practice
or research, or as indicating the need for merely a small adjustment of the paradigm. It appears that in social welfare discourses
a similar process was at work.
Under the sway of non-radical and scientistic forms of psychoanalytic theory, coupled with the authority of medical models of
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disease, most American casework writers of the 1950s and 1960s
consistently failed to live up to their own rhetoric of maximizing
client self-determination. Their paradigm could not account for
the class, gender and cultural control omnipresent in the interaction between client and social worker, and thus interpreted client
resistance as the result of a range of defence mechanisms, ego
weaknesses and poor socialization. The professional assessment
of client "needs" took absolute priority over clients' expression
of their "wants" and so the "casework relationship" could not be
opened up to the client's definition of the situation.
Although based upon a moral critique of the state and the
economy, the social administration paradigm was largely blind to
the negative consequences of organizational forms and practices
which increased bureaucratic and professional power. Despite
the rhetoric of "community participation," belief in the effectiveness of professional and scientific rationality meant that such
participation was token at most: democracy was seen primarily
in terms of political representation through the ballot box, rather
than community and service-user control at the point of policymaking, planning, and the delivery of services.
The Marxist paradigm on the other hand took for granted
that we already know how power is exercised (through exploitive
class relations) and why such power is successful (through economic production and ideological reproduction). The microscopic
processes of power, its diffusion throughout the social system
and its connection to knowledge production could not effectively
be taken into account because a paradigm of the centrality of
production and of class subordinates diverse and contradictory
experience of oppression (gender, race, culture, age etc.) to a
single explanation. Furthermore, certainty about the single locus
of power blinded some Marxist writers to the fact that organizational structures and practices do not necessarily cease to be
oppressive simply because they are legitimated by the reference
to Marxist theorization.
The effects of the power of eurocentric grand narratives within
the discourses on social welfare was, overall, to produce an objectifying tendency which has become the focus of critique by a
potent conjunction of feminism, critical psychoanalysis and now
postmodernism.

18

Journal of Sociology & Social Welfare
Discourse and Truth

The basic assumption behind the discourses we are discussing
is that they were approximations to the truth about the real world
which scientific knowledge has progressively revealed to us. Given that these various discourses were in conflict with each other,
it was assumed further that their verification could ultimately
be settled independently of the discourses themselves by reference to "real" processes in the world. These processes could be
discovered by accumulation of empirical data, by the careful classification of individual and family problems, or in the longer run,
by the outcome of present social processes-how History (with
a capital H) turns out. The issue of the truth of statements was
either removed from politics and seen as an "empirical question"
as the positivists argue, or seen as reflecting the social and political
world as in the case when Marxists claim that the economy ultimately determines intellectual production. In both cases the aim
is to guarantee the claims to objective truth which professional or
scientific discourses make.
Against all of these assumptions that what we say or write
is ultimately determined by "real" objective processes, postmodernism argues that discourse itself determines knowledge production and not the other way around. Postmodernism maintains
that there can be no appeal for verification as to truth to anything
outside discourse because outside one particular discourse can
only be specified some other discourse that always already constructs it in a specific form.
It is the perceived totalitarianism of grand narratives, the
terrible certainty that underlies dogmatic belief in the unrelenting
pursuit of "progress", of the domination of nature and of the
social world, that postmodernism confronts. Guarantees of certainty, "the grand narratives of legitimation" are swept aside by
postmodernism in favour of a predominately relativist position
whereby the criterion of truth or the adequacy of an explanation is
internal to specific discourses: the real only exists because there is
a discourse which describes it. The needs of social services clients
exist, postmodernists might argue, only in so far as social policies
and professional social work has constructed them as objects that
it can assess and respond to. Need does not arise from the social
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services client spontaneously; "needs" are constructed through
discourses and the client is required to fit into them.
By maintaining that what we count as knowledge is determined by specific discourses, the postmodern critique, especially
in the hands of Foucault, points to the oppressive role of professional and scientific discourse in its power to define the social
world and develop technologies of administration and control
in the management of troublesome populations: the mad, the
poor, the criminal. These scientific and professional disciplines
claim objectivity, and see themselves as part of the moral and
social progress of the modem world, but in reality they are profoundly implicated in the discipline and punishment of populations which they (the professionals) legitimate by reference to the
specific discourse within which they are situated. Thus caseworkers often re-defined their clients' culturally specific needs and
"learned to use authority" in the clients' supposed interests; thus
social administrators studied poverty and often increased the
knowledge of governments in the management of the poor; thus
Marxist social workers represented state power and sometimes
justified it by reference to the political rhetoric of revolutionary
consciousness-raising.
Although extremely powerful as critique, postmodern analysis cannot, I believe, be accepted without substantial challenge
and modification. If we are sympathetic to the assault by postmodernists on the idea of grand, unifying theories which claim
universal objectivity, are we therefore compelled to fall entirely
into the relativist camp which takes no account of what goes
on outside of discourses? I think not, for an adequate theory of
discourses must account for resistance to dominant discourses
and the politics involved in the production of knowledge. Foucault's (1967) history of madness, for example, though a powerful
critique of medical ideology, cannot further our understanding of
the social construction of mental health and mental illness in the
present historical juncture, because it lacks an adequate account
of social forces and relations outside of discourse.
It is clear that we can use discourse analysis to reveal to
us, for example, how certain social welfare paradigms, theories
and practices were implicated in "the logic of domination", but
why were they resisted and challenged by new paradigms? Were
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these challenges simply the result of what was happening within
discourses, or were other social events, such as changes in the
balance of class, gender or cultural forces, of major relevance? To
answer these questions we must address the issue of the relation
between knowledge and power.
Knowledge/Power
If we examine the discourses of casework, social administration, and Marxist social work, we shall find that their claims
to truth or adequacy as knowledge took place in the context of
struggles around legitimacy, authority and power; around the relationship between knowledge and ideology. The politics of these
struggles were not simply outside the discourses themselves, but
also inside the knowledge-producing activities with which the
discourses on social welfare interact. The fact that these knowledge-producing activities are outside the narrow boundaries of
scientific and professional disciplines can be seen in the way
that our knowledge about individual and social problems goes
outside social work, or sociology, or medicine, to knowledge inscribed in everyday practices in a variety of institutions-the
family, community organizations, income maintenance agencies,
schools, etc.
It would be absurd to claim in a relativist manner that it is
because the concept of child protection exists that children are
abused. What actually constitutes child abuse however, is essentially a political debate related to questions of cultural diversity
and state control. Child abuse is certainly "real," but it is inextricably caught up in the articulation between different discourses and
practices, whereby each set of activities (such as the practices of
child protection workers, community critiques of these practices,
the articulated claims of ethnic diversity in child rearing) conditions the other. Discourses develop in interaction with a range of
practices which are both discursive and material, practices which
are historical products.
By concentrating on the relationship between knowledge production and power, we are able, I believe, to reject both the absolutist model of scientific truth and the relativist model of discourse
determination. Instead we can focus on the debates and arguments which surround and penetrate scientific and professional
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discourses, examining alternatives and exploring the specific historical and cultural assumptions which contextualize these debates. An approach which emphasizes the significance of power
and resistance in the arguments which take place around major
discourses should provide us with a dynamic picture of the development of social welfare ideas. If we accept the postmodern
account of the oppressive tendencies of the discourses which have
shaped social welfare as material practices which define and act
upon troublesome subject populations, then we must discuss how
these subjects of social intervention are culturally constructed.
The Production of Subjectivity
Postmodernists argue that the most far-reaching illusion of
modernity is that concerning the subject, the belief that there is
an essential self, the author of my intentions, which lies buried
beneath social and intra psychic repression. Postmodernism, allied here to contemporary feminist, psychoanalytic and Marxist
theory (Leonard 1984), is concerned to question this belief and to
ask what are its origins and social consequences. Although the
various critiques of the illusion of a unitary, autonomous self are
at variance with each other, they agree that the individual's sense
of herself as a unitary subject is achieved by her identification with
a dominant discursive formation reflecting class, gender, ethnic
and other relations. Traces of what determined her (discursive
and material practices) are "re-inscribed" in her discourse-she
believes in her autonomy (P&cheux 1982). This process, it is argued, is essentially how-compliance is engineered: subordinate
populations, including social welfare clients, are complicit in their
own oppression through their incorporation of dominant discourses of normality, of health and illness, of what is possible
and impossible, and all of the attendant practices which sediment
these definitions into "common sense".
Holding to the myth of the essential autonomous self was
originally at the root of the American casework use of postFreudian ego psychology with its assessments of strengths and
weaknesses, and its concern with adjustment to "reality". The
principle of client self-determination was based on the notion of
the possibility of autonomous choice, and prevented the theorists
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of American casework from seeing how the discourse of which
they were part permitted choices only within the parameters set
by the discourse, a discourse which defined the "client" and reinscribed this definition in her consciousness: she becomes a client
one can work with because she has accepted her client role.
Similarly, under the influence of British social administration,
social services and health care planning were based upon the
careful categorization of client and patient "needs", supposedly
reflecting the generally common needs of integrated coherent
subjects rather than the diverse, conflicting and culturally varied
needs of different individuals and populations. It was believed
that the users of services were relatively free to make choices
and to participate at least in the evaluation of services-a belief
that largely excluded from the discourse an understanding of
the way in which these very users were, in practice, required to
subordinate themselves to professional perceptions of their needs
and so present an apparent integrated self to whom services could
be delivered.
Marxist social work intended to make the principle of client
self-determination real by helping the individual to understand
how her view of herself was socially constructed within the
context of class and gender relations. In practice, the Marxist
perspective failed to take this understanding to the point of acknowledging and acting upon the fact that discourse determinism
implies multiple identities rather than an integrated subject. Thus
clients or service users were often seen as relatively homogeneous
in terms of their crucial social characteristics, namely members
of the working class or women, in either case subjects whose
consciousness could he raised and whose common needs might
be responded to through community-controlled state services.
The argument concerning the production of subjectivity
might lead us to accept that subjectivity should be theorized
as multiple, a historical product based upon particular forms of
rationality which are produced through particular technologies
and practices. The traditional Enlightenment subject is therefore
displaced into positions within specific discourses, and it is a
range of normative practices and assumptions which produce
in us a model of a unitary, rational and coherent subject to which
we are motivated to aspire. Motivation and intention re-enters
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into this account of subjectivity-the individual is not totally
powerless and determined, but neither is she free to choose unconditionally or without struggle and resistance. It is a position
which will not satisfy many postmodernist critics, but it implies
an optimistic view about the possibilities of change, and perhaps
a more plausible account of subjectivity.
From Deconstruction to Reconstruction
In discussing three discourses on practice I have sought to
show that postmodern critique can be useful in exploring their
modernist domain assumptions, although at many points I have
registered objections to the more extreme and illogical postmodern positions. In any case, quite apart from the notion of postmodernism as a distinct set of political and cultural perspectives,
we should also acknowledge the existence of postmodernity as a
contemporary form of human consciousness. It is a consciousness
rooted in our awareness (and anxiety) that we live in an uncertain,
insecure world without transcendental guarantees about truth,
progress or science, because modernity in either capitalist, or,
briefly, socialist forms, has not delivered what it promised in
terms of freedom, security, and prosperity. In this world we can
no longer, as social workers or social scientists claim to make authoritative judgements about individual or social problems based
upon scientific objectivity any more than we can seek certainty in
tradition. Instead, we are in a world which is more relativist, more
modest in its knowledge claims and hopefully more sensitive to
cultural difference as the eurocentric base of modernity becomes
ever clearer to us.
With this postmodern consciousness, we turn back to look
at the recent history of modernity, at its contradiction between
emancipation and domination, and at present, necessarily perhaps, place more emphasis on its failures than its achievements.
It may be, however, that close examination of the social welfare
discourses of modernity will also enable us to ask what they
might offer, after shedding some of their more strident claims
to universality, certainty and objectivity, to the re-constitution of
critical social welfare practices.
Currently, social welfare is dominated by the concerted push
by governments and multinational corporations to give political
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priority to the establishment of a global market. This class project
is based upon a "modernization" process which is largely indifferent to cultural diversity except where it serves the purposes of
capital accumulation and social regulation, an example, parexcellence, of modernity as domination. In this context, the American
casework tradition of respect for the expressive, relational needs
of clients turns out to be positively progressive, for it contains the
promise that individuals' narratives about their intersubjective
experiences of a destabilized and often hostile world can be given
sustained attention. The tradition of British social administration
as an interdisciplinary field of study and action contains, in its
twin emphases on empirical investigation and ethical critique,
one basis for intellectual, political and moral resistance to those
current forms of modernity which ruthlessly exploit subordinate
populations of the world's poor by prioritizing the drive for markets over all ethical objections.
Finally, Marxist analysis, as it abandons dogmatic and scientistic claims to holding the exclusive key to understanding and articulating emancipatory struggles, has the potential of becoming
a crucial means, alongside other critical perspectives, by which
new forms of practice emerge to face new historical conditions.
Marxist perspectives on social welfare retain their persuasive
power because of their analyses of class relations, of state power,
of the various forms which capitalist exploitation takes, and of
the potential which exists in solidarity and collectivity. Following
the deconstruction and critique of the social welfare practices of
modernity, we are in a position, perhaps, to forge new practices
relevant to the postmodern conditions of uncertainty, cultural
relativity and global interdependence.
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